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Note
The Voices of Victims: Debating the Appropriate
Role of Fraud Victim Allocution Under the Crime
Victims' Rights Act
Julie Kaster*
In December 2008, the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) charged Bernard Madoff with effectuating a multi-
billion dollar Ponzi scheme, the largest in American history.'
The story made front page news for months.2 The sheer amount
of money involved, combined with the number of duped inves-
tors, captured the attention of the American public.3 U.S. Dis-
trict Court Judge Denny Chin, who presided over Madoff's pre-
trial hearings, allowed victims to inform the court of their
desire to participate in the sentencing proceedings.4 On March
16, 2009, the day Madoff pled guilty, victims arrived in court,
waiting for their chance to speak.5 Eventually, Judge Chin gave
nine victims the opportunity to express their pain and anger in
court before the sentencing hearing.6 One victim grieved: "Last
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, University of Minnesota Law School. As with all
of my law school endeavors, there are many to thank. I appreciate those who
helped and supported me along the way. Your assistance over the last three
years is reflected in these pages. A special thank you to my parents, Sandie
and Mark Kaster, for their unending love and to my brother, Brandon Kaster,
for his wit, charm, and insights. I am quite certain that this Note would never
have been published without the overwhelming encouragement of Barry Lan-
dy. Thank you for believing in me. Copyright © 2010 by Julie Kaster.
1. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Bernard L.
Madoff for Multi-Billion Dollar Ponzi Scheme (Dec. 11, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-293.htm.
2. See, e.g., Diana B. Henriques, Madoff Scheme Kept Rippling Outward,
Crossing Borders, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2008, at Al.
3. Id.
4. Jayne Barnard, Op-Ed., Madoff Case: Act Gives Fraud Victims a
Voice, RICH. TIMES DISPATCH, July 2, 2009, http://www2.timesdispatch.com/rtd/
news/opinion/op-edlarticle/ED-BARNARDO2_20090701-180204/277371/.
5. See Jonathan Dienst & Michael Clancy, Bye Bye Bernie: Judge Jails
Madoff After Guilty Plea, NBC CHICAGO, Mar. 16, 2009, http://www.nbc
chicago.com/news/usworld/NATLMadoffs-Victims-Want-Answers.html.
6. See Barnard, supra note 4.
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year, my mother died. Now I don't have my mother or my mon-
ey." Another victim yelled: "Your sons despise you . . . . [You]
are an evil lowlife." Judge Chin subsequently sentenced Madoff
to 150 years in prison.7 The desire of Madoff's victims to foment
their own brand of verbal justice illustrates a larger issue fac-
ing American jurisprudence: what is the appropriate role of vic-
tim allocution in cases of financial fraud?
When prosecutors charge a defendant with a violent crime,
such as rape or assault, judges routinely allow victims the op-
portunity to speak at the sentencing hearing.8 Interestingly, as
of 2001, economic crimes represented over twenty percent of
the federal criminal docket.9 Only since 2004, however, have fi-
nancial fraud victims in federal actions had the statutory right
to speak in open court-a process known as allocution.10 These
rights derive from the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA), a
federal statute that guarantees the right "to be reasonably
heard at any public proceeding in district court involving re-
lease, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding."" As a means
to enforce these rights, the CVRA empowers crime victims to
petition a higher court for a writ of mandamus if the lower
court does not respect their enumerated rights to allocution.12
The CVRA presents a major dilemma to judges. The court
must protect a defendant's constitutional rights while also en-
suring fraud victims statutory empowerment to allocute under
the CVRA. The CVRA does not provide a clear framework for
judges to determine the prescribed role of fraud victims' allocu-
tion. This leaves judges to interpret the reach of the CVRA.
Federal appellate courts diverge on (1) how much deference the
district courts should have to fashion appropriate procedures
under the CVRA, and (2) the proper standard of review for dis-
trict court decisions.13
7. Id.
8. DOUGLAS E. BELOOF ET AL., VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 625 (2d
ed. 2006).
9. Jayne W. Barnard, Allocution for Victims of Economic Crimes, 77 NO-
TRE DAME L. REV. 39, 56 (2001).
10. Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and
Nila Lynn Crime Victims' Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2006); see Barnard,
supra note 9, at 57 (noting that prior to 2004, the right to allocute was only
statutorily available to victims of violent crimes).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 3771.
12. Id.
13. Compare In re Antrobus (Antrobus 1), 519 F.3d 1123, 1124-25 (10th
Cir. 2008) (arguing that the traditionally high standard of review is appropri-
ate in these cases), with Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal.
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The right of victims to allocute under the CVRA raises sub-
stantial questions about the proper role of victims in a criminal
justice system that triumphs constitutional protections for the
accused. Courts currently split over the role of the appellate
court to review and enforce CVRA rights in the lower court.
This Note examines the role of victim allocution within the
criminal justice system and argues that Congress should
amend the CVRA to more clearly articulate fraud victims'
rights.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I explores the his-
toric and current role of victims' rights within the federal legal
system. Part II analyzes the circuit split on the standard of re-
view for a writ of mandamus under the CVRA. Part III propos-
es a renewed debate on the role of fraud victims within the
criminal justice system and argues that Congress should
amend the CVRA by specifically outlining the rights of fraud
victims to allocution within that system. The amendment
should explicitly empower judges to limit fraud victims' rights
to allocution, and only subject that decision to the traditionally
high standard of mandamus review at the appellate court.
I. VICTIMS' RIGHTS WITHIN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM
The role of victims within the criminal justice system-and
the ability of victims to seek redress when a district court does
not respect their rights-has never been a static concept. First,
this Part provides the background necessary to understand the
current debate surrounding the desired role of victims in feder-
al criminal cases. It unravels the historic role of victims' rights
within a federal legal system that is premised on protecting the
constitutional rights of defendants. Next, this Part discusses
the history of the victims' rights movement and the passage of
the CVRA. Last, it outlines the writ of mandamus process and
the circuit split regarding the role of appellate review under the
CVRA.
A. THE HISTORIC RIGHTS OF VICTIMS WITHIN THE ADVERSARY
SYSTEM
The American judicial system traditionally recognizes the
rights of only the criminal defendant and the prosecution in
(Kenna 1), 435 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the CVRA creates
a "unique regime," and thus a lower standard of review is merited).
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criminal proceedings. 14 Victims' rights advocates disagree with
this traditional notion. Rather, they argue that victims have a
distinct interest in criminal proceedings and that their rights
should be included in the judicial process. 15 The juxtaposition of
these two criminal procedure philosophies sets the stage for the
current disagreement over rights of victims under the CVRA.
In criminal judicial proceedings, the government acts on
behalf of the community to ensure justice. 16 The President ap-
points a U.S. attorney in each judicial district to prosecute
crimes.17 The doctrine of prosecutorial discretion gives prosecu-
tors unyielding power to determine whether to pursue criminal
charges, prosecute defendants, or negotiate plea bargains.' 8
The Supreme Court recognizes the broad power given to the
prosecution and therefore declares statutes unconstitutional if
they impermissibly interfere with this power.19
The prosecution's goal is to protect the public interest, and
as such, the interests of third parties, such as victims, are not
directly represented in criminal proceedings. The prosecutor is
a "minister of justice," and his duties run to the public and the
defendant to ensure a just outcome in the case. 20 While the
14. Erin C. Blondel, Note, Victims' Rights in an Adversary System, 58
DUKE L.J. 237, 239 (2008).
15. William T. Pizzi, Victims' Rights: Rethinking Our "Adversary System,"
1999 UTAH L. REV. 349, 349 ("[Victims of violent crime have a stake in the
trial that is different from that of the general public or even the prosecutor.");
see also 150 CONG. REC. S10,910 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Kyl) ("[V'ictims are the persons who are directly harmed by the crime and
they have a stake in the criminal process because of that harm.").
16. As John Marshall put it:
A private suit instituted by an individual, asserting his claim to prop-
erty, can only be controlDl]ed by that individual. The executive can
give no direction concerning it. But a public prosecution carried out in
the name of the United States, can without impropriety be dismissed
at the will of the government.
Representative John Marshall, Speech Delivered in the House of Representa-
tives of the United States, on the Resolutions of the Hon. Edward Livingston,
Relative to Thomas Nash, Alias Jonathan Robbins (Mar. 7, 1800), reprinted in
4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 82, 99 (Charles T. Cullen ed., 1984).
17. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 stat. 73, 92; see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 547(1) (2006) (granting U.S. attorneys the responsibility to "prosecute for all
offenses against the United States").
18. Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doc-
trine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 700-01 (2004).
19. United States v. Murphy, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 203, 209 (1842) ("[Flrom
the very nature of an indictment and the sentence thereon, the government
alone has the right to control the whole proceedings and execution of the sen-
tence.").
20. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2003) ("A prosecutor
2010] 1685
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prosecutor can take into account the general benefits to society
in prosecuting a case, he cannot take into account a specific vic-
tim's agenda regarding the outcome of the case.21
The Constitution has internal checks to ensure that the
prosecution does not operate unfairly with respect to the defen-
dant.22 Indeed, "[olne of the animating features of the Constitu-
tion is its preoccupation with the regulation of the govern-
ment's criminal powers."23 The Framers were mostly concerned
with safeguarding the rights of defendants in the criminal jus-
tice system-as enumerated throughout the Bill of Rights. 24 A
defendant has a general right to a trial that is fair and provides
him with due process under the law.25 Moreover, under the
Sixth Amendment, "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . .. to be confronted with the witnesses
against him."2 6 Practically, a criminal defendant has the right
to challenge the credibility or veracity of witnesses that speak
during the course of a trial or sentencing hearing.27 Allocution
rights under the CVRA may pose challenges to these constitu-
tional protections.
The adversary system has traditionally excluded the rights
of nonadversaries within the courtroom, 28 thereby limiting vic-
tims from meaningful participation in the judicial process.29
Generally, courts have disregarded the role of a victim in the
has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advo-
cate.").
21. See id. cmt. 5 ("A prosecutor can, and should, avoid comments which
have no legitimate law enforcement purpose and have a substantial likelihood
of increasing public opprobrium of the accused.").
22. U.S. CONST. amends. IV-VI.
23. Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58
STAN. L. REV. 989, 1012 (2006).
24. Id. at 1016-17.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
26. Id. amend. VI.
27. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 36-37 (2004).
28. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. Blackstone estab-
lishes that wrongs are divisible into private wrongs, those that harm an indi-
vidual, and public wrongs, those that harm the community. Id. Under this ar-
gument, criminal acts are public wrongs, and thus the state is responsible for
their prosecution. Id. at *3.
29. See BELOOF ET AL., supra note 8, at 11-18. Indeed, until recent times,
victims were "seen at best as 'the forgotten [people]' of the system and, at
wors[t], as being twice victimized, the second time by the very system to which
[they have] turned for justice." William F. McDonald, Towards a Bicentennial
Revolution in Criminal Justice: The Return of the Victim, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
649, 650 (1976).
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criminal system, 30 except, for example, when determining the
proper restitution for a crime victim. 31 Additionally, some fed-
eral statutes and rules allow victims to present impact state-
ments or allocute for specific crimes. 32 The strict application of
the traditional American adversary system, therefore, has
changed over time, and nonparties, such as victims, have
gained additional rights within criminal cases.33
B. THE VICTIMS' RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE PASSAGE OF THE
CVRA
The roots of the modern victims' rights movement stem
from President Ronald Reagan's interest in the issue and his
commission of the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime
in 1982.34 The Task Force's final report presented shocking in-
formation about the treatment of crime victims, claiming that
victims were persecuted in the courtroom when they were de-
nied access to the proceedings or refused the opportunity to
speak.35 This "secondary victimization" 36 in the courtroom was
at the core of the Task Force's recommendation that Congress
30. See State v. Rickey, 10 N.J.L. 83, 84 (1828) ("The idea that a private
person may be interested in a public prosecution, seems to be utterly discarded
in law.").
31. See id. at 84-85.
32. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4)(B) (violent crimes or sexual abuse);
see also 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(d) (2006) (copyright infringement); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3593(a) (2006) (capital sentencing).
33. For example, qui tam provisions give private citizens the right to
bring actions in the government's name. See Christina Orsini Broderick, Note,
Qui Tam Provisions and the Public Interest: An Empirical Analysis, 107 CO-
LUM. L. REV. 949, 949 (2007).
34. The Task Force was commissioned to "conduct a review of national,
state and local policies and programs affecting victims of crime" and to "advise
the President and the Attorney General with respect to actions which can be
undertaken to improve . . . efforts to assist and protect victims of crime." Exec.
Order No. 12,360, 3 C.F.R. 181 (1983); see also PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON
VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT (1982) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S TASK
FORCE], available at http://www.ojp.gov/ovc/publications/presdntstskforcrprt/
87299.pdf. The Task Force found that the criminal justice system had "lost an
essential balance" and "deprived the innocent, the honest, and the helpless of
its protection." PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE, supra, at 114; see also Mary Marga-
ret Giannini, Equal Rights for Equal Rites?: Victim Allocution, Defendant Al-
locution, and the Crime Victims'Rights Act, 26 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 431, 436
(2008).
35. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE, supra note 34, at 10.
36. Id. at 106.
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amend the Sixth Amendment to include language protecting
the rights of crime victims.3 7
The victims' rights movement sought changes in the adver-
sarial structure to include the interests of victims in judicial
proceedings. 38 The movement attempted to secure a constitu-
tional amendment. 39 U.S. Senators Jon Kyl and Dianne Feins-
tein introduced a proposal to amend the Sixth Amendment to
give victims a meaningful right of participation in criminal pro-
ceedings. 40 The proposed amendment faced stiff resistance and
was never adopted. 41
37. Id. at 114 (proposing the addition of "the victim, in every criminal
prosecution shall have the right to be present and to be heard at all critical
stages of judicial proceedings" to the Sixth Amendment).
38. See Douglas Evan Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process: The
Victim Participation Model, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 289, 293-98; John H. Lang-
bein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, 78 MICH. L.
REV. 204, 204 (1979) ("As the death grip of adversary procedure has tightened
around the common law criminal trial, trial has ceased to be workable as a
routine dispositive proceeding."); Blondel, supra note 14, at 251 ("Legal real-
ism agrees with victims' rights advocates: criminal prosecutions affect private
as well as public interests.").
39. William T. Pizzi & Walter Perron, Crime Victims in German Court-
rooms: A Comparative Perspective on American Problems, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L.
37, 39 (1996) (citing Letter from Mary McGhee, co-chair of the Nat'1 Victims'
Constitutional Amendment Network to William T. Pizzi (Nov. 11, 1995) (on
file with the Stanford Journal of International Law)).
40. Senators Kyl and Feinstein introduced S.J. Res. 52 on April 22, 1996.
Jon Kyl et al., On the Wings of Their Angels: The Scott Campbell, Stephanie
Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Victims' Rights
Act, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 581, 589 n.40 (2005). After several changes, S.J.
Res. 44 was introduced in the Senate on April 1, 1998. Id. at 589. The proposal
was also changed in 1999, to S.J. Res. 3, which was sponsored by thirty-three
senators. Id. at 590. However, after three days of debate on the floor of the Se-
nate, the proposal was withdrawn. 148 CONG. REC. S2679 (daily ed. Apr. 15,
2002) (Statement of Sen. Feinstein) ("Ultimately, in the face of a threatened
filibuster, Senator Kyl and I decided to withdraw the amendment."). The last
version of the proposal, S.J. Res. 1, was introduced on January, 10, 2003. Kyl
et al., supra, at 591. For an excellent overview of the history of the proposed
amendment, see id. at 588-91. See also Victoria Schwartz, Recent Develop-
ment, The Victims'Rights Amendment, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 525, 525 (2005)
('The Victims' Rights Amendment is one of the few amendments that has not
only been considered many times, but has also passed the committee level to
reach the floor of the Senate.").
41. See 150 CONG. REc. S4261 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Feinstein) ("Essentially, bottom line, what we have found after numerous Ju-
diciary Committee subcommittee hearings, committee hearings, markups,
putting the victims' rights constitutional amendment out on the Senate floor
in a prior session, taking it down because we didn't have the votes, beginning
anew in this session, going through the processes in committee, and recogniz-
ing that we didn't have the 67 votes necessary for a constitutional amend-
ment-oth Senator Kyl and I, as well as the victims and their advocates, de-
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Victims' rights advocates, including the sponsors of the
proposed amendment, thereafter altered their tactics and lob-
bied for a substantive federal law to ensure victims' rights in
the courtroom. 42 Earlier attempts at federal legislation prom-
ised broad rights to victims, 4 3 but lacked enforcement mechan-
isms to guarantee that victims could hold a court accountable if
the court did not respect their rights.44
Responding to the impotency of these early laws, Congress
passed the Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston,
Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Victims' Rights Act in
2004.45 Section 102(a) of the CVRA provides a laundry list of
victims' rights, including the right to reasonable notice, access,
and ability to be reasonably heard at any public court proceed-
ing.46 In cases with multiple victims, the CVRA directs courts
to create "reasonable procedure[s]" to ensure victims' rights
without complicating or prolonging the judicial proceedings. 47
The new legislation aspired to address the problems that
plagued previous victims' rights legislation. 48 In a departure
cided that we should compromise."). The constitutional amendment failed for a
variety of reasons, which could include that it would "change basic principles
that have been followed throughout American history," that it would "lay
waste to the criminal justice system," and that it would "trivialize" the Consti-
tution. Paul G. Cassell, Barbarians at the Gates? A Reply to the Critics of the
Victims' Rights Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 479, 481. Cassell, however,
concluded that none of these reasons were valid. Id.
42. Kyl et al., supra note 40, at 591.
43. See Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291,
§ 5, 96 Stat. 1248, 1253-55 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (2006)) (allow-
ing the court to award restitution to victims of specific offenses, such as prop-
erty, medical expenses, and physical therapy); Victims' Rights and Restitution
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, tit. V, 104 Stat. 4820, 4820-23 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10601-10608 (2006)) (providing victims substantive
and procedural rights to receive information about the offender); Mandatory
Victims Restitution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 204, 110 Stat. 1227,
1227-29 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2006)) (mandating court-
ordered restitution for certain violent crimes).
44. United States v. McVeigh, 106 F.3d 325, 335 (10th Cir. 1997) (prevent-
ing victims from exercising their statutory right to attend the trial because
they lacked a remedy under the statute to enforce their rights); see also Doug-
las E. Beloof, Judicial Leadership at Sentencing Under the Crime Victims'
Rights Act: Judge Kozinski in Kenna and Judge Cassell in Degenhardt, 19
FED. SENT'G REP. 36, 36 (2006) ("The message of the McVeigh opinion is that if
victims were to have standing Congress would have to explicitly provide it.").
45. Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 102, 118 Stat. 2260, 2261-64 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 3771 (2006)).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(1)-(8) (2006).
47. Id. § 3771(d)(2); see also Giannini, supra note 34, at 456 n.113.
48. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 108-711, at 4 (2004), reprinted in 2004
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from past victims' rights legislation, an additional section of the
CVRA specifically instructs the district court to respect the
rights of victims4 9 and provides recourse for victims if they feel
the district court has violated their rights.50 Specifically, if the
district court refuses to recognize a victim's right to allocute, or
any other right enumerated in the statute, then the CVRA pro-
vides that victim the right to petition the court of appeals for a
writ of mandamus. 51
C. AN ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM STEEPED IN HISTORY AND
ENTRENCHED IN A CIRCUIT SPLIT
While the CVRA represents the current incarnation of the
rights of crime victims, its enforcement mechanism is steeped
in history. 52 As such, an understanding of the writ of manda-
mus, combined with a discussion of the appellate standards of
review, is necessary when dissecting the disagreement among
circuits over the proper role of the CVRA. Additionally, an
overview of the circuit split regarding the writ of mandamus is
warranted to understand this complex issue.
The writ of mandamus is an extraordinary writ in which a
high court compels an inferior court to exercise authority where
it failed to perform its duty or function. 53 The Supreme Court,
and all other courts established by Congress, have the power to
issue writs of mandamus. 54 Traditionally, however, issuance of
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2277; 150 CONG. REC. S10,912 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004)
(statement of Sen. Kyl); 150 CONG. REc. S4262 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004)
(statement of Sen. Feinstein). See generally Fern L. Kletter, Annotation, Va-
lidity, Construction, and Application of Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA), 18
U.S.C.A. § 3771, 26 A.L.R. FED. 2D 451, 462-66 (2008) (discussing the back-
ground of the CVRA).
49. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(b)(1).
50. See id. § 3771(d)(3).
51. Id.; see also FED. R. APP. P. 21(a)(2) (providing the format for the
mandamus petition).
52. See generally Note, Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus Under the
All Writs Act, 86 HARV. L. REV. 595, 598-624 (1973) (describing Supreme
Court mandamus cases between 1957 and 1967).
53. Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34-35 (1980) (per cu-
riam).
54. All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2006) ("The Supreme Court and all
courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appro-
priate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and
principles of law."); see also Martin H. Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to Ap-
pealability in the Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 89, 114 (1975) ("Pursuant
to [28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)], the circuit courts of appeals may issue, inter alia,
writs of mandamus to the district courts . . . .").
[94:16821690
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the writ suggested that a lower court "usurped power or clearly
abused its discretion."55 Courts view the writ, therefore, as a
drastic remedy and utilize it only in extraordinary situations.56
In general appellate proceedings the standard of review is
less stringent than mandamus review.5 7 The standards of re-
view at the appellate level can be divided into three categories:
questions of law are reviewed de novo,58 questions of fact are
reviewed for clear error,59 and discretionary matters are re-
viewed for abuse of discretion.60 The abuse of discretion stan-
dard is the most ambiguous standard as it requires the appel-
late court to look for grossly unsound or unreasonable decisions
of the trial court.61 Review under this standard is generally
deemed the most deferential to the lower court. 62
For some issues, the statutory language plainly articulates
the appropriate level of review.63 If the standard is not clearly
outlined in the statutory language, however, then the appro-
priate standard of review is often ascertained by examining the
historical trend of appellate practice in that area of the law. 6 4
The CVRA's reference to the writ of mandamus has led to a cir-
cuit split: two circuits currently consider interlocutory review
under an abuse of discretion standard,65 while three circuits
55. In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 2005) (cit-
ing In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 1987)).
56. Allied Chem. Corp., 449 U.S. at 34; Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90,
95-96 (1967); Giannini, supra note 34, at 442; Kyl et al., supra note 40, at 619.
57. In re WR. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d at 562.
58. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988). In a de novo review
process, the higher court relies on the record of the trial court, but reviews the
trial court's decisions without deference. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 106 (8th
ed. 2004).
59. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 558. Under the clear error standard, the higher
court reviews questions of fact and looks for decisions made by the trial court
that are unquestionably erroneous. BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY 582 (8th ed.
2004).
60. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 558.
61. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 11 (8th ed. 2004).
62. Haugh v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 949 F.2d 914, 916-17 (7th
Cir. 1991) ("Abuse of discretion is conventionally regarded as a more deferen-
tial standard than clear error. . . .").
63. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act § 2, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006) ("In
any action by a requester regarding the waiver of fees under this section, the
court shall determine the matter de novo. . . .") (emphasis added).
64. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 558.
65. In re Kenna (Kenna 11), 453 F.3d 1136, 1137 (9th Cir. 2006) (per cu-
riam); In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555, 562-63 (2d Cir. 2005).
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use the traditionally higher mandamus standard of review.66
The Supreme Court has yet to accept a case dealing with this
circuit split.67
II. THE INTERSECTION OF CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
AND JUDICIAL IMPLEMENTATION: A TRAIN WRECK
WAITING TO HAPPEN
Ascertaining the proper standard of review for decisions re-
lating to allocution under the CVRA requires an understanding
of Congress's intent combined with a normative conclusion as
to the proper role of victims in the criminal justice system. This
Part dissects Congress's intent in passing the CVRA and re-
views the current circuit split. The failure of Congress to clear-
ly articulate the role of appellate review in CVRA allocution de-
cisions could overload scarce judicial resources and imperil the
constitutional rights of defendants.
A. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT: THE LACK OF CLARITY MEANS
THAT THE HIGHER STANDARD OF REVIEW MAY BE OUT OF REACH
This Part analyzes the plain language of the CVRA and
Congress's intent with respect to the standard of review for
writs of mandamus issued under the Act. Through this lens,
there is strong evidence that the CVRA only contemplates the
traditionally high standard of appellate review in granting a
petition for a writ of mandamus.
1. The CVRA's Plain Meaning
One of the foremost canons of statutory interpretation is
that when the language in the statute is plain, then that mean-
ing controls.6 8 The CVRA specifically calls for the use of a writ
of mandamus.69 Therefore, under the plain meaning analysis, it
66. In re Dawalibi, 338 F. App'x 112, 114 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam); In re
Antrobus (Antrobus 11), 563 F.3d 1092, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009); In re Dean, 527
F.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); see also In re Simons, 567 F.3d 800,
801 (6th Cir. 2009) ("We need not resolve the question of the proper standard
of review . . . because petitioner is entitled to relief under the stricter, tradi-
tional mandamus standard of review."); In re Stewart, 552 F.3d 1285, 1288-89
(11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
67. See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *8-12, In re Local # 46
Metallic Lathers Union v. United States, No. 09-670 (Nov. 6, 2009), 2009 WL
4726610 (arguing that the Supreme Court should review denials of CVRA
mandamus).
68. Cf. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 160 (1997).
69. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) (2006).
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is necessary to ascertain the plain definition of a writ of man-
damus and determine the specific standard of review associated
with it. The writ of mandamus is a historically significant legal
remedy, providing for a drastic remedy that is only invoked in
extraordinary situations. 70 This history connotes an extremely
high standard of review.71
The plain meaning of the standard for the writ is further
supported by analyzing what Congress chose not to state in the
bill.7 2 Congress specifically included the words "writ of manda-
mus" in the legislation, in lieu of other terms such as "imme-
diate appellate review" or "interlocutory appellate review."73
Congress thus included a term that has an important historical
meaning and specifically excluded terms that would have
changed the level of review. Since the term mandamus has an
accustomed meaning, which connotes extremely deferential re-
view to district court decisions, this meaning should control.74
Therefore, the plain meaning of the writ of mandamus within
the CVRA is clear. However, even if critics find ambiguity with
Congress's use of the phrase "writ of mandamus," the legisla-
tive history also supports the conclusion that Congress meant
to have appellate courts utilize the traditionally high standard
of review in CVRA cases.
2. Congressional Discussion Does Not Support a Lower
Standard of Review
Closely examining the words that were included and ex-
cluded from the CVRA suggests that the courts should employ
the traditionally high standard of review associated with the
writ of mandamus. This argument is strengthened further by
70. Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34 (1980) (per cu-
riam). As the Tenth Circuit noted, "[miandamus is a well worn term of art in
our common law tradition." In re Antrobus (Antrobus 1), 519 F.3d 1123, 1127
(10th Cir. 2008).
71. See Antrobus I, 519 F.3d at 1124-25.
72. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEG-
ISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 854 (4th ed. 2007)
("The notion is one of negative implication: the enumeration of certain things
in a statute suggests that the legislature had no intent of including things not
listed or embraced.").
73. SeeAntrobusI, 519 F.3dat 1124.
74. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. EEOC, 405 F.3d 840, 845 (10th Cir. 2005)
("We assume that Congress knows the law and legislates in light of federal
court precedent.").
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dissecting the congressional debate on this bill.7 5 The sponsors
of the CVRA wanted it to be a transformative bill, but the legis-
lative history leading to its passage undermines any contention
that Congress intended to redefine the judicial standard of re-
view of the writ of mandamus.
The CVRA's congressional history is instructive. Senators
Kyl and Feinstein drafted the CVRA as "compromise legisla-
tion" because they were unable to secure a constitutional
amendment. 76 To pass the bill it had to simultaneously accom-
plish two goals: first, it had to placate those who believed the
bill would undermine the adversary system,77 decrease the im-
portance of the Bill of Rights,78 and allow vengeance to reign in
the judicial sphere,7 9 and second, it had to address the short-
comings of previous victims' rights legislation by including a
statutory enforcement mechanism.80 Thus, the sponsors were
careful to draft the bill in such a way that ensured independent
judicial rights for victims8 1 without infringing on the constitu-
75. See Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 162 (1991) ("[A] court appropriately
may refer to a statute's legislative history to resolve statutory ambigui-
ty . . . .").
76. See Kyl et al., supra note 40, at 591.
77. See S. REP. No. 108-191, at 68-69 (2003) ("[The] colonies shifted to a
system of public prosecutions because they viewed the system of private prose-
cutions as 'inefficient, elitist, and sometimes vindictive.' . . . [Tihe Framers be-
lieved victims and defendants alike were best protected by the system of pub-
lic prosecutions that was then, and remains, the American standard for
achieving justice." (citation omitted)); id. at 70 ("[W]e have historically and
proudly eschewed private criminal prosecutions based on our common sense of
democracy.").
78. Id. at 56 ("Never before in the history of the Republic have we passed
a constitutional amendment to guarantee rights to a politically popular group
of citizens at the expense of a powerless minority. . .. Never before . .. have we
... guarantee[d] rights that intrude so technically into such a wide area of
law, and with such serious implications for the Bill of Rights.").
79. Id. at 85-86; see also AMY BARON-EvANS, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, DEFENDING AGAINST THE CRIME VICTIMS RIGHTS ACT 3 (2007), http://
www.fd.org/pdflibvictim%20memo%20to%20defenders.pdf ("Opposition was
also based on the recognition that if victims were allowed to drive the criminal
process, their desire for vengeance and lack of expertise would lead to unfair
and unreliable results.").
80. A Bill Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States To Protect the Rights of Crime Victims: Hearing on S.J. Res. 6 Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 41 (1997) (statement of Janet Reno,
Att'y Gen. of the United States).
81. Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal. (Kenna 1), 435
F.3d 1011, 1013 (9th Cir. 2006) ("The [CVRA] sought to ... mak[e] victims in-
dependent participants in the criminal justice process.").
FRAUD VICTIM ALLOCUTION
tional rights of defendants. 82 To pass the CVRA with an en-
forcement mechanism, the sponsors of the bill were forced to
include the writ of mandamus with its traditionally high stan-
dard of review over district court decisions.83 Anything less
would have been objectionable.
Victims' rights advocates turn this argument on its head by
contending that the enforcement mechanism of a writ of man-
damus was meant to give victims enforceable rights without al-
tering the fundamentals of the Constitution.84 They argue that
the inclusion of the writ of mandamus was not only meant to
appease victims' rights advocates, but also as an expression of a
true compromise that gave victims actual, enforceable rights.85
For that reason, they argue, a lower standard of review was in-
tended.86 This argument is flawed, however, as it fails to appre-
ciate the practical constraints of this "compromise" legislation
and the fact that the CVRA sponsors were capable of including
only a writ of mandamus remedy due to its high standard of re-
view.87
82. See United States v. Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d 319, 333 n.13 (E.D.N.Y.
2005) ("The CVRA plainly strikes a different balance, and it is fair to assume
that it does so to accommodate [those legislators who opposed the constitu-
tional amendment].'); 150 CONG. REC. S4266 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (state-
ment of Sen. Kyl) ("After 8 years of work on the Federal constitutional
amendment, supported by President Bush and the Attorney General, we were
able to schedule, after we passed the bill through the Judiciary Committee,
that constitutional amendment for floor action today. Knowing we would not
have the 67 votes to pass it, we decided it was time to get something tangible
in statute to protect the rights of victims, and accompanying it could be a
modest appropriation of money to help actually support these victims in court
when that was necessary and called for.").
83. Cf. 150 CONG. REC. S4262 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Feinstein).
84. See Emma Schwartz, Giving Crime Victims More of Their Say, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 24, 2007, at 28, 29 ("[Victims' rights advocates] say
the victims' rights laws are not uniformly enforced on a federal level .... ).
85. Cf. 150 CONG. REc. S10,912 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Kyl).
86. See Steven Joffee, Validating Victims: Enforcing Victims' Rights
Through Mandatory Mandamus, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 241, 251 ("[T]he CVRA's
enforcement provision entitles crime victims to ordinary appellate review of
district court decisions denying any of their eight enumerated rights.").
87. When the CVRA came before Congress, it was meant to be a trans-
formational bill-one that dramatically altered the treatment of crime victims
in the federal criminal justice system. See id. at 245. It was designed to be a
"broad and encompassing" statutory victims' bill of rights. 150 CONG. REC.
S4261 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). However, given
this lofty goal, the actual debate surrounding the bill is scarce. See Turner, 367
F. Supp. 2d at 323 n.3. The lack of true discourse on the bill makes it difficult
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There was limited debate on the issue of the writ of man-
damus on the Senate floor.8 8 Senator Feinstein specifically said
that the inclusion of the writ of mandamus implied "a new use
of a very old procedure" that would allow a crime victim to
"immediately appeal a denial of their rights by a trial court to
the court of appeals."89 Senator Feinstein also indicated that
the writ of mandamus would be a tool for crime victims-a
means to ensure that the trial court followed the rights out-
lined in the CVRA.90 Senator Kyl briefly touched on the use of
the term "writ of mandamus" within the statute.91 He ex-
plained that within the CVRA the writ of mandamus would en-
sure appellate review of victims' rights.92 If this enforcement
mechanism was not included in the statute, he explained, then
"a victim [would be] left to the mercy of the very trial court that
may have erred."9 3 These statements by the sponsors of the
CVRA show that they intended to provide the traditional level
of review for appellate court review of CVRA writ of mandamus
petitions. The lack of discussion by any Senator to alter the
standard of review demonstrates that there was no congres-
sional intent to create a unique regime under the CVRA.
Moreover, the only legislative debate with respect to this
bill stemmed from a scripted exchange between the sponsors of
the bill,9 4 a short speech by Senator Kyl, 95 and a description of
the bill in the House Judiciary Committee Report. 96 In a case
discussing the CVRA, one court noted that "[n]owhere in [this]
legislative history ... does one find the debate or exchange of
ideas that more frequently accompanies the art of law-
to conclude that lawmakers wanted to alter the historically accepted use of the
writ of mandamus in the remedial provisions of the law. Cf. Dewsnup v.
Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 419-20 (1992) ("[Wlhere the language [of the statute] is
unambiguous, silence in the legislative history cannot be controlling.").
88. See 150 CONG. REC. S4262 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Feinstein).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 150 CONG. REC. S10,912 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Kyl).
92. See id.
93. Id.
94. See 150 CONG. REC. S4263-64 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statements of
Sens. Kyl and Feinstein).
95. See 150 CONG. REc. S10,910-13 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of
Sen. Kyl).
96. See H.R. REP. No. 108-711, at 10-11 (2004), reprinted in 2004
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2283.
1696 [94:1682
FRAUD VICTIM ALLOCUTION
crafting."97 Additionally, some Senators expressed reservations
that the CVRA had not undergone a more thorough examina-
tion.98 The lack of debate on this bill makes it hard to conclude
that lawmakers wanted to alter the historically accepted use of
the writ of mandamus.
The CVRA was overwhelmingly passed in both the House
and the Senate. 99 That the sponsors were able to secure this
level of support, given the strong opposition to a constitutional
amendment for victims' rights, lends credence to the argument
that Congress did not view this bill as highly controversial.
Given the historical relevance of the writ of mandamus, and
the plain meaning of this well-defined legal term, there is no
evidence that Congress intended to create a unique regime and
change the standard of review of the writ of mandamus under
the CVRA.
B. CONFLICTED CIRCUIT COURTS FAIL TO CAPTURE THE
ESSENTIALS
Circuit courts divide over the proper role of the appellate
courts in granting the writ of mandamus in CVRA cases. The
Second and Ninth Circuits hold that the lower, abuse of discre-
tion standard is appropriate in CVRA cases. 00 For example, in
Kenna v. U.S. District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia, a father and son pled guilty to a large fraud scheme.101 At
the father's sentencing hearing, the victims exercised their
rights under the CVRA to allocute and spoke about the hard-
ship caused by the father-defendant.102 At the son's sentencing
hearing, however, the judge refused to listen to the victim
97. United States v. Marcello, 370 F. Supp. 2d 745, 749 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
98. See, e.g., 150 CONG. REC. S4272 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of
Sen. Leahy) (Senator Leahy, while supporting passage of the CVRA, noted
that "we had so little opportunity to work on crafting the crime victims' sta-
tute. I would have liked to have gotten the views of the Office for Victims of
Crime and other components of the Department of Justice, for exam-
ple. ... [We had] no time to hold hearings on it or improve the bill in Commit-
tee.").
99. See Kyl et al., supra note 40, at 593 ("House Resolution 5107 passed
the House by a vote of 393 to 14.. . . [It] passed the Senate by unanimous con-
sent.").
100. See Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal. (Kenna 1), 435
F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2006); In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d
555, 564 (2d Cir. 2005).
101. Kenna 1, 435 F.3d at 1012-13 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 1013.
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statements because he had listened to the victims last
time."1 03 The victims filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. 104
The appellate court noted that "[tihe CVRA creates a
unique regime that does, in fact, contemplate routine interlocu-
tory review of district court decisions denying rights asserted
under the statute."105 Under this framework, the court of ap-
peals granted the writ of mandamus and demanded that the
district court allow the victims to speak at the son's sentencing
hearing. 106 The court noted that the CVRA was meant "to make
victims full participants in the criminal justice system," and
"puts crime victims on the same footing" as "[p]rosecutors and
defendants [who] already have the right to speak at sentenc-
ing."107
As evidenced by the court in Kenna, the Second and Ninth
Circuits have effectively created a "unique regime" under the
CVRA where the writ of mandamus takes on a new meaning
and gives broad power to victims to allocute.108 Under this re-
gime, the appellate court must entertain all petitions for a writ
of mandamus under the statute and the district court's discre-
tionary power over allocution decisions is limited. These cir-
cuits, therefore, alter the traditionally discretionary nature of
the writ in this context.
Several other circuits, however, strongly disagree with the
circuits that alter the standard of review for writs of manda-
mus. Specifically, the Third, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits hold the
traditional mandamus standard should be employed when de-
termining whether to issue the writ under the CVRA.109 This
was explicitly discussed in In re Antrobus, when several victims
felt that the district court had not respected their rights. 110 The
victims filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the appel-
late court.111 The appellate court, using the traditional man-
damus standard of review, denied the writ.112
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1017 (emphasis added).
106. See id. at 1018.
107. Id. at 1016.
108. See id. at 1017.
109. In re Dawalibi, 338 F. App'x 112, 114 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam); In re
Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 391 (5th Cir. 2008); In re Antrobus (Antrobus 1), 519 F.3d
1123, 1127 (10th Cir. 2008).
110. Antrobus I, 519 F.3d at 1123.
111. Id. at 1124.
112. Id. at 1124, 1126.
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C. THE RIGHTS OF FRAUD VICTIMS To ALLOCUTE IN THE
ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM
The lack of debate on the enforcement provision in the
CVRA makes it particularly troubling that certain appellate
courts are now expanding the use of the writ of mandamus in
unusual ways to augment the rights of financial fraud victims
to allocution.113 While the CVRA gives courts the ability to fa-
shion appropriate procedures for allocution when there are
multiple crime victims,1 14 appellate courts are decreasing the
district court's discretion by employing a unique regime for the
writ of mandamus.115 This section argues that although fraud
victim allocution does serve a beneficial purpose, judicial econ-
omy and potential constitutional concerns require that district
courts have the power to limit victims' rights when appropriate.
1. The Benefits of Allocution
Crime victims' rights to allocution are beneficial to both the
victim and the court. 16 Victim allocution provides information
to the sentencer, 117 benefits the victim by providing an outlet
for anger and grief,118 gives the defendant an opportunity to
understand the impact of his crime, 119 and improves society's
perception of sentencing.120 Additionally, allocution is a tool to
(1) empower the victim, (2) educate the defendant, and (3) in-
form the court. 121
These arguments for a victim's right to allocution apply
just as forcefully to fraud victims as to victims of violent
crimes.122 In cases of federal fraud, judges would be aided by
113. See, e.g., Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal. (Kenna
1), 435 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2006).
114. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(2) (2006).
115. See, e.g., Kenna I, 435 F.3d at 1017.
116. See Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 619-25 (2009) (discussing justifications for victim impact
statements).
117. See PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE, supra note 34, at 76-77 ("A judge can-
not evaluate the seriousness of a defendant's conduct without knowing how
the crime has burdened the victim.").
118. See Cassell, supra note 116, at 621 ("[E]ven if a victim has nothing to
say that would directly alter the court's sentence, a chance to speak still serves
important purposes. .... '[Victim] allocution is both a rite and a right."' (quot-
ing United States v. Degenhardt, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1349 (D. Utah 2005))).
119. Id. at 624.
120. Id.
121. Giannini, supra note 34, at 444.
122. See Barnard, supra note 9, at 57.
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understanding the severity of the defendant's crimes. 123 Strong
evidence also exists that victims of financial crimes would reap
benefits from allocution in the form of public acknowledgement
of their pain. 124 As seen by the victims' intense desire to allo-
cute at Madoff's hearings and the response of Judge Chin, the
allocution of these fraud victims was instrumental in Madoff's
sentencing.125 The diverse benefits of victim allocution, howev-
er, must be weighed against the potential harms of unlimited
victim allocution to the defendant and to the court.
2. The Harms of Allocution to Defendants
While a victim's right to allocution has broad benefits, it is
not without potential drawbacks. Importantly, the constitu-
tional rights of defendants must supersede the statutory right
of fraud victims to allocute.126 First, a victim's right to allocu-
tion could arguably interfere with a defendant's right to due
process. Notably, courts recognize that victim statements must
not unduly prejudice the defendant or cause confusion for the
judge. 127 "Information overload may ... lead to unfair sentenc-
ing. As the amount of information and the number of people
testifying at a sentencing hearing increases, so does the risk of
unjust punishment." 128 The manner in which victims allocute
may also unduly influence a judge; overly passionate words or
images that are presented by a victim may lead to harsher sen-
tencing by the judge. Therefore, courts must be wary of any
system of allocution that could prejudice courts against the de-
fendant and undermine his right to due process.
Second, allocution by victims may raise Confrontation
Clause concerns. Defendants will argue that they have a right
under the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause to chal-
123. See id. at 62.
124. See id. at 52.
125. See Barnard, supra note 4 ("[The nine victims who spoke, and the
scores of others in the courtroom, had a powerful impact on the judge. In en-
tering the sentence, he re-told the story of one victim, a recent widow, who had
gone to Madoff's office to thank him for looking out for her family's funds.
You're safe,' Madoff assured her. Judge Chin also noted the thousands of 'life
decisions'-about retirement, college savings, health care for parents, and
where and how to live-victims had made in reliance on Bernie Madoff.").
126. See generally Barkow, supra note 23, at 1012 (discussing the threat of
legislation violating the constitutional rights of defendants).
127. See, e.g., State v. Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164, 176 (N.J. 1996).
128. Katie Long, Note, Community Input at Sentencing: Victim's Right or
Victim's Revenge?, 75 B.U. L. REV. 187, 223 (1995).
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lenge the veracity of a victim's statement. 129 Indeed, many
questions arise with respect to a defendant's right to challenge
a victim's statement. It is important to determine whether the
defendant has a right to cross-examine a victim who makes an
oral statement. 130 Additionally, issues abound about whether
the defendant would have an opportunity to challenge evidence
that is proffered by the victim or to give a rebuttal.13 1 As such,
the information provided by the victim during allocution may
raise both due process and Confrontation Clause issues.
3. The Harms of Allocution to the Judicial System
In addition to the constitutional concerns raised by allocu-
tion, unlimited victim allocution, especially in crimes involving
financial fraud, has drawbacks for the judicial system. Specifi-
cally, in financial fraud cases there are often many victims, and
therefore, the right to allocution is likely to result in repetitive
statements. 132 Additionally, allowing many victims to allocute
will take substantial time to complete.133 Victims may have
similar stories to espouse, and they may present evidence that
is duplicative of that which was already received during tri-
al.13 4 Judicial economy requires that the court be allowed to
limit the number of victims that can allocute and the manner
in which they can allocute in these cases.
Overall, the plain meaning of the CVRA and the congres-
sional history surrounding its passage support the conclusion
that Congress meant to impose the traditionally high standard
of review on petitions for mandamus under the CVRA. Even
with that congressional history, however, courts divide on
whether victims' rights should create a unique regime in which
fraud victims would enjoy a lower standard of review for their
rights to allocution. While there are strong arguments that
129. David E. Aaronson, New Rights and Remedies, The Federal Crime Vic-
tims' Rights Act of 2004, 28 PACE L. REV. 623, 658 (2008); see also Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 64-65 (2004) (suggesting that allocutions are testi-
monial in nature and therefore implicate the Sixth Amendment's Confronta-
tion Clause).
130. JEFRI WOOD, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE CRIME VICTIMS' RIGHTs ACT OF
2004 AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 8 (2008), http://www.fic.gov/public/pdf.nsf/
lookup/cvra08O6.pdfl$file/cvraO8O6.pdf.
131. Id.
132. See Barnard, supra note 9, at 65 ("[R]equiring a court to entertain the
testimony of an economic victim or a group of victims will inevitably take up
some scarce court time.").
133. Id.
134. Id. at 66.
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support victim allocution, the potential for harm to the defen-
dant and the judicial system require a clearer standard of re-
view. In the current moment of widespread financial fraud,
Congress should amend the CVRA to more clearly identify the
rights of fraud victims to allocute-as well as the rights of the
court to limit such allocution.
III. AMENDING THE CVRA TO CREATE MORE
REASONABLE PROCEDURES FOR FRAUD VICTIMS'
ALLOCUTION
The current articulation of the CVRA attempts to address
the potential problems of allocution by including language that
allows courts to create "reasonable procedure[s]" to ensure vic-
tims' rights without complicating or prolonging the judicial pro-
ceedings when there are multiple victims. 3 5 Appellate courts
are not giving full effect to this deferential language. For in-
stance, the Ninth Circuit in Kenna disregarded this language
by employing a "unique regime" for the writ of mandamus and
using its power to force the district court to allow allocution for
the victims. 136
Given the potential drawbacks of unlimited allocution, this
Part proposes that Congress amend the CVRA to specify the
contours of victims' rights to allocution.13 7 Specifically, this
Part outlines an amendment to the CVRA in which fraud vic-
tims would have the right to allocute, but which also more
clearly identifies the right of the district court to limit fraud
victims' allocution. This Part also contends that the CVRA
should identify that a judge's decision with regard to fraud vic-
tim allocution should only be subject to the traditionally high
standard of mandamus review on appeal.
A. THE NEED FOR CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE AND DISCUSSION ON
VICTIMs' RIGHTS
According to the founders, the role of Congress and the
reason for a representative form of government is "to refine and
135. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(2) (2006); see Giannini, supra note 34, at 456.
136. Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal. (Kenna 1), 435
F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2006).
137. Indeed, studies of the CVRA since its enactment show that while it
has some effect, a better enforcement mechanism is essential to its success.
See DEAN G. KILPATRICK ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUS-
TICE, THE RIGHTS OF CRIME VICTIMS-DOES LEGAL PROTECTION MAKE A DIF-
FERENCE? 1 (1998), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/173839.pdf.
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enlarge the public views." 138 Congress's deliberative role is
meant to create legislation through a process of argumentation
and debate, in which weak ideas are disposed of and only those
ideas that garner enough support are able to survive. 139
With regard to the current articulation of the CVRA, this
process utterly failed. The role of Congress as the locus of na-
tional debate, combined with the lack of clarity under the
CVRA, shows that Congress must revisit this issue. This deli-
berative body must fully consider the practical implications of
including victims' rights in the courtroom. Only through this
process will crime victims, courts, and the country gain a real
understanding of what role nonparty victims should play in the
criminal justice system. 140
It is important that Congress remain in control of these
changes to the CVRA. Even though this issue manifests itself
in a circuit split, the Supreme Court is not the appropriate fo-
rum to determine the proper role of crime victims to allocute.
First, judges must focus on the case in front of them. 141 Accor-
dingly, judges should not be put in the position of de facto poli-
cy makers by framing the policy implications of the broad
rights of crime victims. Second, judges are not immune from
the social and political pressures that might attend controver-
sial cases.142 Even where judges act with the greatest impar-
tiality, there is a risk that the perception of siding with victims'
rights can undermine the proceedings and lead to a prejudicial
effect on the defendant.143 Thus, leaving the important question
of the nature, extent, and ability to enforce victims' rights with
an uncertain judiciary may result in judges with agendas set-
ting the national rules regarding the rights of crime victims.
138. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 21 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed.,
1981).
139. See George E. Connor & Bruce I. Oppenheimer, Deliberation: An Un-
timed Value in a Timed Game, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 315, 317-18
(Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 5th ed. 1993).
140. Id.
141. See Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure,
Due Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL
L. REV. 1181, 1189 (2005).
142. Id.
143. Id.
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B. SUBTLY LIMITING THE ROLE OF ALLOCUTION IN FRAUD
CASES
Given the potential problems of unlimited victim allocution
during fraud cases, Congress should amend the CVRA to expli-
citly state the rights of fraud victims to allocute-and the
rights of the court to end such allocution. Under a revised ver-
sion of the CVRA, a judge could still create a "reasonable pro-
cedure" to ensure fraud victims' the right to allocute without
complicating or prolonging the judicial proceedings when there
are multiple victims. 14 4 As such, under the statute, victims
would realize the benefits of allocution at the trial court level,
including providing information to the judge and using the
process as a cathartic release.
The existence of a reasonable procedure, however, has
proven to be an insufficient safeguard. In Kenna, the appellate
court all but ignored the ability of the district court to fashion
reasonable procedures and granted the victims the writ of
mandamus using a new, lower standard of review. 145 Therefore,
the newly amended CVRA should recognize the need for dis-
trict court judges to maintain control over the courtroom and
protect the constitutional rights of defendants. As such, the sta-
tute should state that judges may justifiably limit the rights of
fraud victims to allocute if their allocution threatens the consti-
tutional rights of defendants or provides duplicative evidence
that burdens the judicial resources of the court. This statutory
language would give judges more latitude to create reasonable
procedures by giving them sensible reasons to limit the rights
of fraud victims to allocute.
Additionally, under the revised statute, victims should still
have the right to petition the court for a writ of mandamus, but
the appellate court would be required to review such a petition
using the traditionally high standard for mandamus. This
higher standard of review is appropriate for two reasons. First,
as previously discussed, there is no evidence that Congress in-
tended to create a unique regime for mandamus review under
the CVRA. Therefore, it is inappropriate for courts to unilate-
rally alter the traditional writ. Second, judicial economy and
defendants' constitutional rights require that fraud victims'
rights to allocute be limited, if necessary. In fraud cases, the
144. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(2) (2006); see also Giannini, supra note 34, at 456.
145. See Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal. (Kenna 1), 435
F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2006).
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number of victims is often substantial, giving rise to repetitive
evidence that a judge should be able to limit at his discretion.
As such, there is strong evidence that appellate court review of
mandamus petitions for fraud victim allocution should be lim-
ited to the traditionally high standard of review.
Congress should amend the CVRA in a manner that pro-
vides victims with rights while championing the constitutional
protections of the defendant and working within the adversari-
al system. Amending the CVRA to outline explicitly the rights
of fraud victims to allocute and giving district courts more lati-
tude to fashion reasonable procedures provides a workable so-
lution. Such an amendment is urgent given the current state of
the economy and the plethora of financial fraud cases. Now is
the moment that Congress must clearly delineate the role of
crime victims in federal fraud cases-the proposed amendment
to the CVRA clearly accomplishes this goal.
CONCLUSION
The economic collapse of 2008 witnessed the greatest ex-
plosion of financial fraud cases in recent memory. Madoff's vic-
tims-as well as the victims of the thousands of other Ponzi
schemes-often employ their rights under the CVRA to allocute
during a defendant's sentencing hearing. Unfortunately, the
rights of fraud victims to allocute and the ability of the judge to
fashion reasonable procedures is ambiguous under the CVRA.
The current circuit split as to the proper standard of appellate
review highlights this uncertainty as courts wrestle with
whether victims' rights to allocution should be absolute or
whether the district court truly has the power to fashion such
reasonable procedures as it deems fit.
The benefits of allocution are well known, but the constitu-
tional rights of defendants as well as the judicial economy of
the court must temper victims' rights to allocution. Past con-
gressional action on this issue has failed to capture the contro-
versies that are inherent in this problem. Congress must act to
amend the CVRA to delineate explicitly the rights of fraud vic-
tims to allocute and the rights of judges to maintain control
over their courtrooms. Congress must articulate victims' rights
to allocute, but it must temper those rights by clearly identify-
ing a court's right to limit allocution. Given the current eco-
nomic environment and the large number of financial fraud
cases, it is imperative that Congress act to clarify the rights of
fraud victims to allocute within the criminal justice system.
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